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Abstract The determinants of communal conflicts in Indonesia have been widely documented. However, most of them 
ignore geographical aspects of communal conflicts. This paper examines geographical determinants of communal con-
flicts in Indonesia. Data comes from the 2008 Village Potential Census (Podes) and official statistics which consist of 
communal conflict information across all Indonesia’s districts (N districts = 465). Results from spatial dependent model 
show that communal conflict to be spatially dependent through latent determinants, meaning that communal conflict 
clusters because of clustering of latent determinants within district. Rather than religious and ethnic heterogeneity, com-
munal conflict is positively associated with poverty, economic inequality, elite capture, and weak capacity of districts to 
manage fiscal resources.
Abstrak Penelitian terdahulu tentang determinan sengketa komunal di Indonesia telah banyak dilakukan. Namun demiki-
an, belum banyak penelitian yang menjelaskan bagaimana hubungan geografi terhadap sengketa komunal. Penelitian ini 
mengkaji bagaimana hubungan geografi terhadap sengketa komunal di Indonesia. Data bersumber dari Sensus Potensi 
Desa (Podes) 2008 dan laporan statistik pemerintah yang berisi informasi menegenai sengketa komunal di seluruh kabu-
paten/kota di Indonesia (N kabupaten/kota=465). Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa sengketa komunal di Indonesia ter-
jadi dikarenakan adanya faktor-faktor latent di dalam kabupaten/kota. Daripada keragaman agama dan etnik, sengketa 
komunal berhubungan kuat dengan kemiskinan, ketimpangan ekonomi, elite capture dan lemahnya kapasitas kabupaten/
kota dalam mengelola sumber-sumber fiskal daerah. 
Keywords: Communal conflict, Spatial dependent, Contagious, Latent issue
Kata kunci: Sengketa komunal, Spatial dependent, Contagious, Isu latent
1.Introduction
Efforts to maintain collective security are at the 
heart of human history: from the earliest times, the 
recognition that human safety depends on collaboration 
has been a motivating factor for the formation of village 
communities, cities and nation-states. The 21st century 
was dominated by interstate communal conflicts and 
wars which threats human security and well-being 
across Africa, Middle East and Asia [UNDP, 2011]. 
World Development Reports 2011 title “Conflict, 
Security and Development” reports that deaths from 
communal conflicts and wars, while still exacting an 
unacceptable toll, are one-quarter of what they were in 
the 1980’s. Violence and conflict have not been banished: 
one in four people on the planet, more than 1.5 billion, 
live in fragile and conflict-affected states or in countries 
with very high levels of criminal violence [UNDP, 
2011].  Yet, insecurity not only remains, it has become 
a primary social, political and economic development 
challenge in conflict-affected countries across Africa, 
Middle East and Asia. While much of the world has 
made rapid progress in reducing poverty in the past 
60 years, areas characterized by repeated cycles of 
political and criminal violence are being left far behind, 
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their economic growth compromised and their human 
development indicators stagnant [World Bank, 2011]. 
The history of communal conflicts in developing 
countries’ context has put Indonesia in the list 
particularly after the political and economic crisis 1998. 
During that period, the incidence of communal conflicts 
was not only substantially increase in number but also 
spread across districts of the country archipelagos. The 
government official statistics reports the incidence of 
communal conflict increases from 12 percent between 
1990 and 1995 to 67 percent between 1997 and 2014 
with a large percentage occurred between 1997 and 
2002 [BPS, 2015].  In 1997, the communal conflict 
between indigenous Dayaks and some indigenous 
Malays against the immigrant Madurese group in West 
Kalimantan caused around 4,500 people death and 
670,000 displaced [BPS, 2011]. In 1999, there was a 
conflict going in Poso Sulawesi. The worst episode was 
this past spring when there were 300 people killed in 
the conflict between Christian-Muslim [BPS, 2010]. 
Further, the conflict in the Moluccas between 1999-
2002 where about 4,000 people have been killed in 
Christian-Muslim fighting, and about 500,000 displaces 
were the worst of the conflicts that Indonesia are facing 
but even there it is almost a misnomer to see it as 
arising from some long-seated religious dispute [BPS, 
2011]. Moreover, there were also periodic eruptions of 
communal conflict in Lombok, Eastern Bali, in Kupang 
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in West Timor, in in West and East Java. Not only because 
ethnicity and religious issues, but also there are a lot of 
historical, political and economic factors that are lying 
at the root of these communal conflicts [Klinken, 2007]. 
Studies on communal conflicts in Indonesia after 
the economic crisis 1998 have been linked with the role 
of political crisis and decentralisation reform in the early 
1999 in producing communal conflicts [see for example, 
Murshed et al., 2009; Welsh, 2008; Klinken, 2007]. 
All these studies documented that decentralisation 
reforms were associated with communal conflicts in 
some places. For example, Klinken [2007] documented 
democracy transition in Indonesia was far less peaceful 
than is often though. He reported that democracy 
transition in the country was followed by widespread 
communal conflicts which threatened more than 
10,000 lives of people across archipelago.  However, 
Murshed et al. [2009] found that routine social violence 
in Java is negatively associated with the impact of fiscal 
decentralisation and the size of local government. Fiscal 
decentralisation reduces routine social conflicts during 
decentralisation but it is only with richer districts. 
Despite the fruitful results, prior studies have several 
limitations. First, most of them link the significant 
outbreak of violence during the political transition 
with the decentralisation reform directly, implying 
that decentralisation was a cause of the violence [see 
Klinken, 2007; Welsh, 2008].  Second, some of prior 
studies used limited geographical coverages. For 
example, Murshed et al. [2009] study only covered 
districts within Java Island and therefore the findings 
can only be generalized within social conflicts across 
districts in this Island. Third, most importantly from 
a temporal variation perspective at the national level, 
prior studies ignore the spatial variations in communal 
conflicts following local political transition and 
decentralisation reform. Ignoring spatial dimension of 
communal conflict may result in bias estimate in which 
the results unable to control unobserved factors across 
districts that may relate to widespread communal 
conflicts incidence [Morenoff & Sampson, 1997].
Spatiality has gained increasing attention within 
communal conflict literature, especially from the 
perspective of space not merely as a static product 
but rather as an active agent that informs and affects 
inter-groups relations. The important of spatiality 
in communal conflict studies address limitation of 
closed polity approach which assumes that community 
conflict is a function of the specific characteristics 
prevailing in individual communities and disregards 
the potential influence or regional factors [Sambanis, 
2005]. In contrast, spatial approach of community 
conflict assumes that communal conflicts tend 
to cluster spatially in certain geographic areas. 
A number of studies have shown that countries 
in proximity to states involved in violent conflict 
[Ward & Gleditsch, 1998; Weidman & Ward, 2010].
Studies identify two mechanisms by which spatial 
may affect communal conflicts Ward & Gleditsch, 
1998; Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008; Weidman & Ward, 
2010]. First, contagious effects assume that communal 
conflicts spread through space much like a disease, 
which potentially devastating consequences for human 
development. A large empirical literature documents 
the fact that communal conflicts cluster in space and 
time, so that areas close to an already existing conflict are 
more likely to become involved in conflicts themselves 
[Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008]. This literature had led 
some to conclude that conflicts have a propensity for 
contagion, in the sense that a communal conflict in 
one region may bring about the onset of communal 
conflict in a nearby region within a short time period. 
Second, latent effects assume that communal 
conflict clusters appear due to regional similarity. Hence, 
the geographic clustering of community conflicts may 
arise due to a corresponding clustering of domestic 
factors believed to promote conflict. In this case, any 
apparent distributional pattern of conflict disappears 
due to a systematic fashion of domestic factors. Hegre 
et al. [2001] for example found evidence of contagion 
of conflict from neighboring states, and conclude that 
the apparent clustering of civil war is fully explained by 
the clustering of domestic factors such as the absence 
of democratic institutions. Moreover, many economic 
shocks known to cause conflicts, like droughts and 
changes in commodity prices which are also associated 
with space. In this case, what looks like contagion might 
simple direct results of such economic shocks that affect 
a wider geographical area and sparked conflicts over 
a short period of time [Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008].
This paper aims to address prior studies limitations 
by examining the spatial aspects of sub-national 
communal conflict in Indonesia. Three questions are 
addressed in this paper: How is spatial distribution 
of communal conflict incidence across districts in 
Indonesia? In what ways communal conflicts occur 
across districts? What are the risk factors associated with 
communal conflicts incidence across districts? Does 
communal conflicts across districts contagious or latent 
issues? In order to answer these questions we employ 
the Village Potential Census Data (Podes) data 2008. 
The data consists of more than 7,200 villages across all 
465 districts in the country. Spatial linear regression 
analysis is used to test whether communal conflict is 
contagious or latent issues. The next section discusses 
the detailed statistical method used in this study.
2.The Methods
This study used quantitative method. The main 
data come from the Village Potential Cencus (Podes) 
2008 dataset. The Podes is a longstanding tradition of 
collecting data at the lowest administrative tier of local 
government. Podes consist of more than 7,200 villages 
(desa) and urban neighborhoods (kelurahan) across all 
465 districts in Indonesia. The census has been conducted 
every two years by the Indonesia Central Bureau of 
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Table 2. Determinants, definition and data sources
Determinants Definition Sources
Communal conflict Total number of communal conflict within a 
district in 2008
BPS Podes 2008
Gini Index District Gini Index in 2008 BPS 2008
Poverty Mean of poor people within district in 2008 BPS Susenas 2008
Log district gross domestic product Logarithmic value of district gross domestic 
product in 2008
BPS 2008
Proportion of villages with malnutrition 
case
Percentage of villages within district with 
malnutrition case in 2008
BPS Podes 2008
Multiple religion Percentage of villages within a district with 
more than one religion in 2008
BPS Podes 2008
Multiple ethnic groups Percentage of villages within a district with 
more than one ethnicity in 2008
BPS Podes 2008
Age of direct democracy Age of direct local government election 
(pilkadal) in 2008
MoH 2008
Political dynasty District with political dynasty in 2008 MoH 2014
Log district general balancing fund Logarithmic of district general balancing 
fund (dana alokasi umum) in 2008 
SIKD 2007
Close to state borders Dummy indicators indicating districts locat-
ed in or around state border.
MoH 2008
Share migrants Percentage of migrant people on total popu-
lation in 2008
BPS-Podes 2008
Share of urban area Percentage of urban area within a district in 
2008
BPS-Podes 2008
Land converted to industry Percentage of land converted by industries 
within a district in 2008
BPS-Podes 2008
Mining area District has a mining area BPS-Podes 2008
Distance to government administration Distance in kilometres between villages to 
district government administration
BPS-Podes 2008
Log population Logarithmic total number of district popula-
tion in 2008
BPS 2008
Eastern Indonesia Eastern part of Indonesia BPS-Podes 2008
District proliferation A dummy variable indicating a proliferated 
district (pemekaran)
MoH 2008
Figure 1. Geographical distribution of communal conflict in Indonesia 2008 (Source: Podes 2008 communal 
conflict data calculated by author)
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Figure 2. Geographical distribution of total death caused by communal conflict in Indonesia 2008 (Source: Podes 2008 
communal conflict data calculated by author)
Figure 3. Geographical distribution of material lost (in Million rupiah) due to communal conflict in Indonesia 
2008 (Source: Podes 2008 communal conflict data calculated by author)
Statistic (Biro Pusat Statistik) since 1983. Detailed 
information is gathered on a range of characteristics- 
ranging from public infrastructures to village finance. 
Information is gathered from kepala desa (rural village 
heads) and lurah (urban neighborhood heads). Since 
2003, Podes included questions to measure communal 
conflicts within village. In this study, we used Podes 
2008 which also have information about communal 
conflicts and the impacts of the conflicts (fatalities, 
injuries, and material damage). Podes 2008 also include 
some information about malnutrition case, religion, 
ethnicity, migrant people, land converted to industry, 
mining areas, village head education, and distance 
from village to district government administration.
Following Galtung [1965], communal conflict 
in this paper is defined as violent conflict between 
non-state groups that are organised along a shared 
communal identity. The groups involved are non-
state groups, meaning that neither actor controls the 
state and armed forces (although state actors may 
be involved as an important supporting actor in a 
communal conflict). These groups are often organised 
along a shared communal identity, meaning that they 
are not formally organized rebel groups or militias 
but that the confrontation takes place along the 
line of group identities. Gurr [2000] further explain 
communal identity as subjective group identification 
based on a common history, a common culture or 
common core values. In this definition, communal 
identity also refers to ethnic or religious identity. Podes 
2008 provides information about this type of conflict. 
We link the communal conflict data from Podes 
2008 with official statistics. First, we linked the Podes 
data with Gross Domestic Data (GDP) 2008 from the 
Indonesia Central Bureau of Statistics. Second, poverty, 
Gini Index and population data were retrieved from 
the Indonesia Central Bureau of Statistics. Poverty was 
calculated from household expenditure questionnaires 
of Social Economic Survey (Susenas) 2008. Third, we 
linked the Podes 2008 data with age of local election 
data from the Ministry of Home Affairs to examine 
whether age of local democracy as measured by age of 
local election relates with communal conflicts. Fourth, 
we retrieved information about existing political 
dynasty from the Ministry of Home Affairs. Fifth, 
district balancing fund data or dana alokasi umum 
was linked to test whether fiscal decentralisation 
affects communal conflicts across districts. The 
district balancing fund data were retrieved from the 
Ministry of Finance. Sixth, the geographical areas and 
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latitude/longitude data were used to examine whether 
districts in the borders areas have higher risk to 
communal conflicts than other districts. Table 2 below 
shows determinants of communal conflicts that are 
included in the model, definitions and sources of data.
We include four determinants which theoretically 
linked with communal conflicts in Indonesia. First, Gini 
Index, poverty and malnutrition cases within a district 
are used to examine economic pathways of the incidence 
of communal conflict [Stewart, 2008; Gleditsch et al., 
2009]. Second, to examine ethno-cultural pathways 
of communal conflicts we include multiple religions 
and ethnic group indicators [Hegree et. al, 2001]. 
Third, age of direct of local democracy, village head 
education and district balancing fund are used to test 
institutional pathways of communal conflicts [Baron et 
al., 2009]. Fourth, existing political dynasty is included 
to test political pathways of communal conflicts. Local 
democracy in Indonesia has been characterised by raja-
raja kecil (little king) which results in political dynasty 
within local government [Klinken, 2007; Coppel, 2006]. 
Geographical determinants such as district at and 
around state border, share of urban area, and land 
converted to industry are included to control whether 
geographic proximity and urban development relate with 
communal conflicts. Demographic determinants such 
as share of migrants and total population are included 
to control whether migration and population affect 
communal conflict. Likewise, eastern Indonesia and 
district proliferation are included since decentralisation 
encourages local elite to create new district governments.
We applied several statistical analyses to describe 
spatial distribution of communal conflicts and to 
test whether the incidence of communal conflict is 
contagious or latent issues. First, spatial descriptive 
analysis was used to describe geographical distribution 
of communal conflicts across districts in Indonesia. 
Communal conflict maps were created using spmap 
program in STATA 13.0. Second, in order to test whether 
communal conflicts across districts are contagious or 
latent issues, we used spatial linear regression analysis. 
We compare estimations results of Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS), spatial lag and spatial error models in 
the analysis to test the contagious or latent issues of 
communal conflict incidences [Bivand et al., 2008]. 
3.Results and Discussion
We begin by presenting geographical distribution 
of communal conflict in Indonesia. Figure 1 describes 
geographical distribution of communal conflict in 
Indonesia. The highest incidence shows at district 
across Papua province particularly districts in the 
border areas such as Jayapura, Mappi, Mamberamo 
Raya and Supiori. Most of these districts are new 
created districts which are established following 
decentralisation. High number of communal conflict 
also occurs across districts at North Sumatra province 
such as Langkat, Deli Serdang, and Karo as well as Aceh 
province such as Aceh Tengah, Aceh Besar, and Aceh 
Tenggara. It also shows a dense communal conflict in 
Jakarta, capital city of Indonesia and Tangerang district 
in Banten province. Tangerang is also recognised 
as a new district created following decentralisation.
Figure 2 describes number of population death 
caused by communal conflict across districts in Indonesia 
2008. The high number of death is showed across districts 
at Papua, particularly districts in the border areas such 
as Jayapura, Mappi, Mamberamo Raya, Yahukimo, and 
Supiori. A high number of deaths are also showed at 
some districts at Central Sulawesi and North Sumatra. 
Not only death, communal conflict also results in 
material lost. Figure 3 shows geographical distribution 
of material lost due to communal conflict across districts 
in Indonesia. The highest number of material lost occurs 
at districts across East Papua, some districts at North 
Sumatra, Aceh, and West Java province. However, we do 
not find a substantial material loss of communal conflict 
at Kalimantan province and some district at Central 
Java, Yogyakarta and southern part of East Java province.
Table 3 shows regression results of political, 
institutional, economic and ethno-cultural determinants 
of communal conflicts in Indonesia. The coefficient 
of OLS, spatial error, and spatial lag estimation show 
consistent results. Gini Index shows positive association 
with number of communal conflict indicating the 
detrimental effect of district economic inequality on 
conflict. Likewise, districts with high number of poverty 
and malnutrition are likely risks to communal conflict. 
However, log district GDP has positive relationship 
with communal conflict indicating that communal 
conflicts likely occurs in rich districts rather than in 
poor districts. Multiple religion and ethnic groups have 
negative association with communal conflict. However, 
the results show not significance, meaning that religion 
and ethnic heterogeneity seem not risk factors of 
community conflict across districts in Indonesia. 
Political dynasty increases communal conflicts. In 
all models, it shows a significant association between 
districts with political dynasty and higher number of 
communal conflicts. Age of direct democracy leads to 
communal conflict but the relationship is not significant. 
Street level bureaucracy capacity as measured by village 
head education is negatively associated with communal 
conflict. However, fiscal decentralisation as measured by 
district balancing fund increases communal conflicts. 
Migration and districts located close to state border 
have high risk to communal conflict. However, this 
association appears not significant.  Urbanisation and 
industrialisation both increase to communal conflict. 
Likewise, distance to government administration, 
population and district proliferation triggers communal 
conflict. As expected, districts located at Eastern part 
of Indonesia have higher risk to communal conflict. 
Results of spatial error model shows significant 
relationship of latent factors (λ=0.881, ***p < 
0.01). However, results of spatial lag model shows 
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Table 3. Regression results of communal conflict in Indonesia 2008
OLS Spatial error Spatial lag
Coef. se Coef. se Coef. se
Gini index 40.813*** 13.291 38.183*** 12.481 42.764*** 13.157
Poverty 12.495*** 3.646 12.022*** 3.634 12.201*** 3.596
Log district gross domestic product 1.727*** 0.439 1.623*** 0.448 1.752*** 0.432
Proportion of villages with malnutrition 
case
0.700*** 0.103 0.699*** 0.102 0.695*** 0.102
Multiple religion -1.715 1.787 -1.832 1.767 -1.949 1.767
Multiple ethnic groups -6.652 2.671 -6.562 2.641 -6.474 2.632
Political dynasty 2.450*** 0.231 2.402*** 0.211 2.285*** 0.200
Age of direct democracy 5.452 2.472 0.102 0.356 0.085 0.356
Village head education: high school and 
above
-1.410*** 0.111 -1.312*** 0.100 -1.215*** 0.090
Log district balancing fund 0.012*** 0.003 0.011*** 0.002 0.015*** 0.002
Close to state borders 0.248 0.165 0.217 0.153 0.269 0.141
Share migrants 0.068 0.266 0.052 0.233 0.061 0.212
Share of urban area 5.350*** 1.548 4.250*** 1.328 4.310*** 1.310
Land converted to industry 1.546*** 0.025 1.326*** 0.021 1.421*** 0.018
Mining area 3.014 2.987 2.015 2.147 2.112 2.141
Distance to government administration 2.146*** 0.037 2.116*** 0.034 2.421*** 0.021
Log population 2.328*** 0.503 2.327*** 0.504 2.427*** 0.401
Eastern Indonesia 2.621*** 0.012 2.531*** 0.011 2.611*** 0.010
District proliferation 1.321*** 0.022 1.211*** 0.011 1.221*** 0.010
Constant -46.967*** 12.437 -42.377*** 13.442 -49.284*** 12.737
R 19%
Rho 0.0272 0.019
Lambda 0.881*** 0.006
Reported ***p < 0.01
insignificant relationship (p=0.0272, p > 0.1) meaning 
that communal conflict in one district do not trigger 
conflict in their neighbouring districts. Otherwise, 
the significant results of spatial error model indicate 
that conflict in one particular district is likely 
result in from latent factors within the districts.
       This paper aims to examine spatial aspects of sub-
national communal conflict and its risk factors in 
Indonesia. The main results show that the incidence of 
communal conflict in Indonesia to be spatially dependent 
through latent factors, meaning that communal conflict 
clusters due to clustering of latent factors at district level. 
In contrast with many qualitative findings, we do not find 
empirical evidence of contagious effect of communal 
conflict in the country [Klinken, 2007; Urwasi, 2015]. 
       This study shows three main pathways in which 
communal conflicts escalate across districts. First, 
communal conflict between districts occurs due to 
endemic problems of poverty and economic inequality 
across districts. The empirical evidence shows that 
communal conflict occurs within poorer districts 
and districts with higher Gini Index. These results 
confirm classical literature of communal conflicts 
which provides a strong foundation of economic 
pathway of community conflict escalation. Stewart 
[2008] for instance highlight that regions with 
poorer and more unequal distribution of wealth are 
held to be more vulnerable to communal conflicts. 
Second, communal conflict between districts 
escalates due to weaknesses of district democratic 
institutions and lack capacity of street level bureaucracy. 
As we found that risks of communal conflict appear 
within districts which have less capacity of village head 
and immature local democracy.  These results confirm 
the work of institutional pathways in understanding 
communal conflict in Indonesia.  Baron et al. [2009], 
Tajima et al. [2004] and Risa [2016], for example, found 
that clashed within communities often occurs due to 
the absence of a formal rule of law and lack of capacity 
of local leaders and state institution to enforce decision.
Third, communal conflict between districts in 
Indonesia also occurs due to political reason. The 
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political competition during direct local election gives a 
reason for communal conflicts. In many cases, political 
competition over political representation uses ethnic 
division to mobilise support and intra-elite competition 
at district to manipulate long terms elite capture 
[Klinken, 2007].  The rise of raja-raja kecil (little king) and 
dinasti politik (political dynasty) in local level following 
political decentralisation support this evidence.  As 
also shows in this study that district with exist political 
dynasty have higher risks to community conflicts.
Other important findings show that rather than 
religious and ethnic heterogeneity, communal conflict 
across districts is positively associated with poverty, 
economic inequality and weak capacity of districts 
to manage fiscal resources. In all models, we found 
no significant association between religious and 
ethnic heterogeneity and the incidence of communal 
conflict. In contrast, a strong association is showed 
on the relation between economic, political and 
institutional factors of communal conflict. The 
significant association of these factors contrast with 
prior studies that strongly argue that religion and ethnic 
heterogeneity are the main determinants of communal 
conflict in the country [see for example, Klinken, 2007]. 
Instead of religion and ethnic heterogeneity, this study 
shows that lack capacity of street level bureaucrats, 
immature local democracy, political dynasty, 
poverty and economic inequality are roots issue of 
communal conflict across districts in the country. 
This study also found that decentralisation 
increases the incidence of communal conflict through 
lack capacity of district government in managing fiscal 
resources. Decentralisation has transferred abundant 
fiscal resources to from central government to district 
government. With poor capacity of district government 
in managing fiscal resources, in many cases the resources 
do not give benefits to local people and therefore 
triggering communal conflict. Klinken [2007] for 
example noted that communal conflict incidence often 
occurs at eastern part of Indonesia which most of them 
have lack capacity to manage resource. As also seen from 
this study, communal conflict incidences are strongly 
related with new districts government which most of 
them still have lack capacity to manage fiscal resources. 
There are two limitations of these studies. First, 
this study is based on cross-sectional data so that it 
only provides one shot capture of communal conflict 
in Indonesia. Therefore, the future studies may 
useful to examine risk factors of communal conflict 
in the country using longer time of data. Second, 
the statistical analysis used in this study is unable to 
account the structure of Podes data which is based 
on village rather than on district. Future studies 
therefore are useful using multilevel spatial modelling 
to account for heterogeneity across villages within 
district [see for example, Morenoff & Simpson, 1997].
Despite these limitations, this study has several 
important implications on the communal conflict 
literature in developing countries particularly 
Indonesia as well as policy to solve community 
conflict. First, the significant findings of spatial error 
model imply that the root issues of communal conflict 
in decentralised Indonesia are latent issues within 
districts particularly increasing poverty, economic 
inequality, paternalism and primordialism following 
political decentralisation in the country. From policy 
perspective, therefore, the politicians and government 
should notice that sooner or later the widespread of 
issues such as paternalism and primordialism in the 
country as manifested by increasing politik dinasti 
(political dynasty) will lead to communal conflict. 
Second, the significant finding of political, institutional 
and economic risk factors confirms prior studies across 
developing countries that the source of widespread of 
communal conflict in developing countries is acute 
problems of elite capture, weak institution, and poverty 
[see for example Murshed 2009; World Bank 2011; 
UNDP, 2011]. These findings highlight the importance 
of strengthening local government capacity, local 
democratic institution and poverty reduction to 
combat communal conflicts. For Indonesia, improving 
local government capacity especially in managing fiscal 
resources to reduce poverty and to increase inclusive 
growth that benefit for both rich and poor people 
across the archipelago may be a strategic pathway.
4.Conclusion
Communal conflicts in decentralised Indonesia 
vary across districts. High risk communal conflicts 
appear across Papua, North Sumatra and Aceh, 
Jakarta and Tangerang province. In decentralised 
Indonesia, communal conflict to be spatially 
dependent through latent factors, meaning that 
communal conflict clusters because of clustering of 
latent factors within district. Rather than religious and 
ethnic heterogeneity, communal conflict is positively 
associated with poverty, economic inequality, elite 
capture, and weak capacity of districts to manage fiscal 
resources. These findings highlight the importance 
of strengthening local government capacity, local 
democratic institution and poverty reduction to 
combat communal conflicts across archipelago.
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